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I. INTRODUCTION

It is well settled that international trade is an integral part of an evergrowing interdependent world economy. The World Trade Organization
(WTO) was established in 1995 to provide its 144 member nations' (members)
with a regulatory and enforcement framework to facilitate free trade.2 Free trade
refers to the absence of tariffs or other obstructions that hinder the flow of goods
and services across international boundaries.3 President George W. Bush has
declared free trade "a moral imperative" and his predecessor, Bill Clinton, was

I.
World Trade Organization, The WTO, at http:llwww.wto.orglenglishlthe-wtoe/thewto-e.htm
(last visited Aug. 29, 2002).
2.

MarrakeshAgreement Establishing The World Trade Organization, 33 I.L.M. 1144-45 (1994).

3.

Mark Weisbrot, Tricks of Free Trade, SIERRA, Sept./Oct., 2001, at 64.

564

ILSA Journalof International& Comparative Law [Vol. 9:563

an unabashed proponent of free trade. While "free trade" is heralded as a
positive and benign pursuit, the term is a misnomer because there are hidden
environmental costs associated with WTO free trade regulations.
The WTO has come under attack by a cross section of United States
society concerned with the diminished United States power to restrict
environmentally dangerous products or products harvested or produced in
environmentally dangerous methods out of the United States market. United
States environmental groups are concerned that the WTO quest to remove trade
barriers is also removing many hard-fought national environmental laws.' The
groups cite recent WTO decisions ruling that environmental protection laws are
impediments to free trade.6 WTO rulings in the Tuna-Dolphin dispute,7 the
Reformulated-Gasoline dispute,8 and the most recent Shrimp-Turtle dispute,9 are
cited as a pattern of a WTO assault on United States environmental law
sovereignty. Members of Congress have expressed concern about the WTO, on
the floor of the House of Representatives, stating that the social and
environmental costs of free trade far outweigh the benefits.'0 As WTO
decisions remove barriers to trade by distorting United States environmental
laws, a recent Gallup poll found that almost 60% of Americans side with
environmental protection where environmental and economic needs conflict."
The WTO openly proclaims that it is not an environmental protection
agency, and has no intention of becoming one.' 2 The WTO believes that
GATT/WTO provisions allow significant latitude for countries to pursue their
own environmental laws, provided that the environmental laws do not

4.

Id.

5.
See Public Citizen, WTO and Environment, Health & Safety, at http://www.citizen.org/
trade/two/ENVIRONMENT/ (last visited June 10, 2002).
6.

Id.

7.
The WTO ruled that the Marine Mammal Protection Act requiring a ban on tuna caught with
nets that kill dolphins violated GATT. GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel
Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594, 1623 (1991).
8.
World Trade OrganizationAppellate Body: Report of the Appellate Body in United States Stardardsfor Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996).
9.
The WTO ruled in the first Shrimp Turtle Dispute that the United States certification requiring
the use of Turtle Exclusion Devices by countries importing wild shrimp to the United States violated GATT.
WTO Appellate Body Report on United States: Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 155 (Oct. 12 1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report I] (last visited Mar. 1, 2003).
10.
Concern with the Next Round of the WTO and Trade Liberalization:Hearingon HE2276, 106th
Cong., Ist Sess. (statement of Eni F.H. Faleomavega).
11.
Gallup's 2001 Earth Day Report, Gallup Pool Special Reports, at http://www.gallup.com/poll/
specialReports/poolSummaries/srO 10416.asp?Version=p (last visited June 13, 2002).
12.
The WTO and its Committee on Trade and Environment, supra,at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratoe/envire/issu le.htm (last visited May 28, 2002).
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discriminate. 3 This article will examine the interpretation of applicable WTO
rules as they apply to United States environmental laws as discriminatory and
barriers to free trade, and the effect of the WTO' s rulings on the sovereignty of
United States environmental laws. This article will include background on: the
WTO and the dispute resolution process; the recently decided trade dispute
where India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Thailand attacked a United States
environmental law aimed at protecting sea turtles from United States and
international shrimp trawling activities (Shrimp Turtle I); an analysis of the
impact on United States environmental law sovereignty of WTO rulings in
Shrimp Turtle I and a later WTO ruling on a complaint against the United States
by Malaysia (Shrimp Turtle II).
II.BACKGROUND
A. Development of the WTO
In 1947, the original GATT agreement was created to reduce trade barriers
and to promote economic growth among all nations of the world. 14 In an effort
to strengthen the original agreement, trade ministers from the 124 nations that
signed the GATT agreement met in Uruguay in 1986 for the "Uruguay Round"
of trade negotiations.' 5 To monitor evolving trade issues, members met
annually to reduce trade barriers. 16 On April 15, 1994, the Uruguay Round
created the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization."
President Clinton signed the agreement on December 8, 1994 that made the
United States a WTO member effective January 1, 1995.'8 The original GATT
agreement and subsequent amendments comprising GATT 1994 had no
enforcement mechanism for settling disputes between members.' 9 For the first
time, the WTO provided GATT members with a mechanism for international
trade dispute resolution.2" Basically, the WTO is an international legal entity

13.

Id.

14.
Cindy Joffe Hyman, Foodfor Thought: Defending the Organic Foods ProductionAct of 1990
Against Claims of Protectionism, 14 Emory Int'l. Rev. 1719, 1737 (1990).
15.

Id.

16.

Id. at 1738.

17.

Id.

18.
Scott Daniel McBride, Reformulating Executive and Legislative Relationships After
Reformulated Gasoline: What's Best for Trade and the Environment?, 23 WM, & MARY J. ENVTL. L. &

POLY REV. 299, 304 (1998).
19.

Id.

20.

Id.

566

ILSA Journalof International& ComparativeLaw [Vol. 9:563

incorporating, governing, and enforcing the GATT agreement. 2' The Uruguay
Round's Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) created the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) for more effective dispute resolution. The DSB is
charged with overseeing the four phases of dispute resolution: consultation; the
use of a judicial panel; the appeal of panel decisions to the Appellate Body; and
the implementation and compliance of final decisions.23
The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and
Annex II of the agreement delineate the structure and dispute resolution process
of the WTO. The WTO is accorded a legal personality and is granted the legal
capacity by its members as may be necessary to exercise its functions.24 The
Ministerial Conference is the head of the WTO organizational structure and is
composed of representatives from all members that meet at least once every two
years. 25 The General Council, composed of representatives off all members,
meets in the intervals between the Ministerial meetings as appropriate. 26 The
General Council meets when necessary as the DSB and appoints a panel to
resolve trade disputes between members. 27 The Committee on Trade and the
Environment (CTE) is a corollary committee mandated " to identify relationship
between trade measures and environmental measures in order to promote
sustainable development... [and] to make appropriate recommendations on
whether any modifications of the provisions of the multilateral trading system
are required, compatible with the open, equitable and non-discriminatory nature
of the system. ''28 The CTE has failed to make any modifications to any
substantive provisions of GATT relating to environmental trade disputes as of
the date of the Shrimp Turtle I Appellate Body report of 1998.29
B. WTO Dispute Resolution Process
The DSB was created to administer the trade rules of the WTO and to
handle consultations and dispute settlement between disputing trade members.3"
21.

Id.at 305.

22.
Tracy P. Varghesee, The WTO's Shrimp-TurtleDecisions: The ExtraterritorialEnforcument of
United States Environmental Policy Via Unilateral Trade Embargoes, 8 ENVTL. L. 421, 426 (2002)
[hereinafter Varghesee].
23.

Id.

24.

Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 4.

25.

Id.

26.

Id.

27.

Id.

28.

The WTO and its Committee on Trade and Environment,supra note 12.

29.

Appellate Body Report I, supra note 9, at 155.

30.
Understandingon Rule and ProceduresGoverning the Settlement of Disputes, 33 I.L.M. 1225,
1226 (1994), available at http://www.tcc.mac.doc/gov/cgi-bin/doit.egi?204:64888616544: 295 [hereinafter
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The DSB has the authority to establish panels, adopt Panel and Appellate Body
reports, oversee the implementation of rulings and authorize trade sanctions
against non-compliant members. 31 The Panel and Appellate Body are
appointed, not elected, and the deliberations are confidential and limited to the
members involved in the dispute.32 If a request is made for consultation by one
trade member to another, the other member is required to respond within ten
days and enter into negotiations no later than thirty days from the date of the
request.3 3 If the consultations fail to settle a dispute within sixty days after the
request for consultations, the complaining party may request the establishment
of a panel.34 A panel, composed of three members with trade law experience,
examines: the dispute in light of the relevant provisions cited by the parties to
the dispute, and provides findings that will assist the DSB in following the
ruling or making alternate recommendations.35 A single panel is established
when more than one member requests the establishment of a panel related to the
same dispute.36 The Panel submits its findings to the DSB typically within six
months from the Panel's establishment. 37 During this period a draft report is
sent to the disputing members that includes the Panel's tentative findings and
conclusions and provides the disputing members an opportunity to submit their
comments to the Panel in writing.38 Panel discussions are strictly confidential
and opinions expressed by the panelists remain anonymous. 39 After submission
of the Panel's final report, the DSB has sixty days to adopt the report unless a
member to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal the
decision.4 ° When a member notifies the DSB of intent to appeal, a seven-person
Appellate Body is assembled by the DSB.4" The proceedings of the Appellate
Body are strictly confidential and they must produce a final report to the DSB.42
The Appellate Body may offer recommendations on how a member can bring
a trade policy into compliance and suggest methods of implementation.43 The
Understandingon Rules and Procedures).
31.

Id.

32.

Id. at arts.4, 8 & 14.

33.

Id.

34.

Id.

35.

Understanding on Rules and Procedures, supra note 30, at art. 8.

36.

Id. at art. 9.

37.

Id. at art. 12.

38.

Id. at art. 15.

39.

Id. at art. 14.

40.

Understanding on Rules and Procedures, supra note 30, at art. 16.

41.

Id.
at art. 17.

42.

Id.
at art. 19.

43.

Id.
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Appellate Body Report is adopted by the DSB, unless the DSB decides not to
adopt the report by consensus within thirty days of receiving it.' If the member
found violating its WTO obligations does not comply within a reasonable time
to the stated recommendations, the member must enter into negotiations with
the complaining member to determine mutually acceptable compensation. If
these negotiations fail to produce a satisfactory result, the member bringing the
complaint can implement appropriate trade barriers to the non-conforming
members goods and services.4"
C. Development of the Shrimp Turtle Controversy
Shrimp trawling is destructive to essential marine habitat and snares and
kills millions of tons of incidental marine life, and kills thousands of endangered
sea turtles every year. The destructive ecological impact of trawling is
evidenced in the Gulf of Mexico where shrimp trawlers incidentally kill not
only sea turtles, but throw overboard approximately two billion pounds of
commercially feasible fish a year.' There are six species of sea turtles present
in United States waters that are protected from trawling and other disruptive
human activity by the Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973. 47 Since 1975,
all species of sea turtles have been internationally recognized as endangered
through inclusion in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Flora and Fauna.4 8 In 1990, The National Academy of Sciences
(NAS) report, The Decline of the Sea Turtles - Causes and Prevention,
estimated that up to 55,000 sea turtles died annually in the Gulf of Mexico and
the Southeast Atlantic shrimp trawl fisheries.49 The report found shrimp
trawling to be the most destructive human cause of sea turtle mortality. 5° The
NAS recommended that the best method of reducing sea turtle mortality, short
of eliminating trawling, was the use of Turtle Exclusion Devices (TEDs). 5 1 The
NAS report further found that sea turtles were a highly migratory species, not
limited to the waters of the United States In 1987, pursuant to the ESA,

44.

Id. at art. 17.

45.

Understanding on Rules and Procedures , supra note 30, at art. 22.

46.

Ted Williams, The Exclusion of Sea Turtles, AUDUBON, Jan., 1990, at 28.

47.

Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).

48.
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3,
1973, 1087 U.S.T. 8249.
49.

NAT'L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUBLIC REVIEW OF THE

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES REPORT ON THE DECLINE OF SEA TURTLES - -CAUSES AND PREVENTION,

55 Fed. Reg. 23259, 23262.
50.

Id.

51.

Id. at 23, 265.
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regulations were passed requiring all United States shrimp trawlers to use TEDs
by 1990.52 A TED is panel of large mesh webbings or metal grids inserted into
shrimp nets. As the nets are dragged along the ocean floor, shrimp pass by the
TED and are collected, while other large marine mammals like sea turtles are
deflected out of the net by an escape hatch. 53 In 1989, the United States
Congress amended Title Eight of the Endangered Species Act, with Section 609,
to protect sea turtles on an international basis.54 Section 609(a)(1) required the
Secretary of State to initiate bilateral and multi-lateral negotiations with foreign
countries to protect sea turtles. Secondly, Section 609(b)(1) banned the
importation of wild shrimp into the United States, harvested with commercial
fishing technology without meeting a prescribed certification process. 5 Under
the original 1991 Section 609(b)(2)(A-C) guidelines, the President had to certify
that:
[T]he harvesting nation had provided documentary evidence of the
adoption of a regulatory program regarding the incidental taking of
turtles during harvesting that was comparable to the U.S.; the
incidental taking of the vessel of the harvesting nation must be
comparable to the incidental taking of sea turtles by U.S. vessels; or
the specific fishing environment of the harvesting nation did not pose
a threat of the incidental taking of sea turtles during harvesting.56
Soon thereafter, the United States initiated hemispheric negotiations on
turtle protection specifically requiring the use of TEDs that culminated in the
Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles
(Inter-American Convention) in 1996."7 Earth Island Institute, a United States
environmental organization, brought suit against the Department of State to
expand the Section 609 use of TEDs internationally.58 In 1995, the United
States Court of International Trade ruled in favor of the environmental plaintiffs
and gave the federal government until May 1996 to implement the Section 609

52.

Sea Turtle Conservation: Shrimp Trawling Requirements 52 Fed. Reg. 24,244, 24,247-49 (June

29, 1987).
53.

See Tom Bayles, Sea Turtle Deaths Set Record in 2001; Boat Collisions, Shrimping Nets and

an Unidentified Parasisteare Being Blamed, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, Feb. 12, 2002, at B, available
at 2002 WL 388457 1.
54.

16 U.S.C. § 1537.

55.

Id. at § 1537(a), (b).

56.

Id.

57.

Sanford Gaines, The WTO's Reading of the GA TT Article XX Chapeau:A DisguisedRestriction

on Environmental Measures, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 739, 766-67 (2001) [hereinafter Gaines].
58.

Id.
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TED requirements worldwide. 9 The 1996 guidelines promulgated by the
Department of State, assessing and certifying the regulatory program of all
harvesting nations, specifically required the use of TEDs that were comparable
in effectiveness of the United States.'
Im[. SHRIMP TURTLE DISPUTE

The new certification guidelines requiring TEDs were immediately
challenged by India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Thailand and a panel was
established by the DSB in February 1997.61 The Panel concluded that the
United States guidelines violated Article XI (1) of GATT 1994 as a quantitative
barrier to trade, and could not be justified as an exception under article XX of
GATT 1994.62 The Panel recommended to the DSB that the United States bring
the guidelines into compliance with its obligations under the WTO agreement.63
The United States appealed the Panel's decision.
It will be helpful to address the pertinent sections of Article XI and XX of
GATT referred to in the Panel's decision. Article XI (1) states:
[N]o prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export
licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any
contacting party on the importation or sale for export of any other
contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any
product destined for the territory of any other contracting party. 6'
Article XX states the allowable exceptions to Article XI (1). Article XX
is comprised of the introductory paragraph, referred to as the "chapeau", and is
followed by paragraphs (b) and (g). Subject to the requirement that such
measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by

59.

Earth Is. Inst. v. Christopher,890 F. Supp. 1085 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995).

60. The revised guidelines stated that" the average incidental take rate will be deemed comparable
if the harvesting nation requires the use of TEDs in a manner comparable to that of the United States program
.
Revised
.... Notice if Guidelines for Determining Comparability of Foreign Programs for the Protection of
Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 61 Fed. Reg. 17342, (April 19, 1996).
61.

WTO: US - Import Prohibitionof Shrimp, 37 I.L.M 832, 835.

62.

See id. at 857.

63.

Id.

64.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55
U.N.T.S. 187, Oct. 30, 1947.
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any contracting party of measures: (b) necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health; (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions
on domestic production or consumption.65
A. United StatesAppeals the Panel ruling
On July 23, 1998, the United States filed an appellant's submission and on
August 19, 1998, oral arguments commenced before the Appellate Body.66 The
United States appeal included four arguments: the Panel's reasoning that "a
threat to the multilateral trading system" precluded the measure for
consideration under Article XX; the Panel's decision that the Section 609
guidelines were unjustifiably discriminatory; the Panel's assertion that Section
609 treats members differently; and
the Panel's sequence of analysis of Article
67
XX pursuant to the controversy.
The Panel report ruled that the United States measure, irrespective of the
important environmental purpose, was a clear threat to the multilateral trading
system. 68 Since Article XX made no mention of the hypothetical effects of
threats to the multilateral trading system as a disqualifying criterion, the United
States argued that the Panel had added a new obligation under Article XX of
GATT.69 Moreover, the U.S warned that the Panel's adoption of a nebulous and
subjective threat to the multilateral trading system would alter the intended role
of the Panel under the DSU, and would question the legitimacy of the dispute
resolution process.70
Secondly, the United States asserted that it had presented adequate
rationale regarding the justifiability of Section 609's import restrictions. 7 1 They
argued that most members, including the appellees, recognize the importance
of preserving sea turtles, and it's undisputed that shrimp trawling without using
TEDs greatly contributes to sea turtle mortality.7 2 The Panel recognized that
"TEDs when properly installed and used and adapted to the local area, would
be an effective tool for the preservation of sea turtles., 73 Furthermore the
United States claimed that the Panel failed to consider the context of the term

65.

Id. at art. XX (b), (g).

66.

Appellate Body Report I, supra note 9,

67.

Id.

68.

Id. 113.

69.

Id.

70.

Id. 123.

71.

Appellate Body Report I, supra note 9,

72.

Id.

73.

Id. 26.

9 - 28.

13.
11.
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"unjustifiable discrimination.,

74

The Article XX chapeau allows for exceptions
such as paragraph (g) if they are not abusive.75 The Panel's ruling was
inconsistent with that of the Appellate Body in the Reformulated - Gasoline
Report of 1996.76 The United States asserted, in that context, trade restrictions
between countries where the same conditions prevail is not abusive as
unjustifiable or arbitrary discrimination, or disguised restrictions, where the
policy goal of the Article XX exception provides rationale for the justification.77
The United States contended that Section 609 did not treat countries whose
shrimp trawling industries pose similar risk to sea turtles differently. 78 The
United States reasoned that restrictions applied only to members with shrimp
trawling industries that employ mechanized equipment that harvest shrimp in
waters with the presence of sea turtles.7 9 United States shrimp trawlers were
burdened by the same TED regulation as foreign shrimp trawlers. The United
States reiterated that it applied exactly the same sea turtle conservation
guidelines to United States and foreign shrimp trawling vessels.
Lastly, the United States argued that the Panel made no findings as to the
applicability of section 609 to Article XX (b) or (g). 80 In essence, the panel
disqualified the United States trade restriction by virtue of the chapeau's
unjustifiable discrimination, arbitrary discrimination, and disguised restrictions
tests, without first testing the applicability of the restrictions under the
exceptions of Article XX (b) or (g). 8' The United States reasoned that had the
Panel initially applied the section 609 guideline to Article XX (g), it would have
found that they met each element under Article XX (g), thus qualifying under
the chapeau.82 Sea turtles are an endangered species and an exhaustible natural
resource under paragraph (g), and the international trade harvesting restrictions
were made in conjunction with domestic harvesting restrictions.8 3 Alternatively,
the United States argued that Section 609 was necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health, under Article XX (b), as TEDs are necessary
because other measures to protect sea turtles are much less effective. 84

74.

Id. 14.

75.

Id.

76.

Appellate Body Report I, supra note 9,1 14.

77.

Id.

78.

Id.1 21.

79.

Id.

80.

Id.
124.

81.

Appellate Body Report I, supra note 9, 24.

82.

Id. 25.

83.

Id.

84.

Jd. 128.
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The appellees parroted the Panel's findings in their response to the
Appellate Body. They claimed that the 1996 Section 609 guidelines were
implemented without first trying to reach a joint multilateral solution with the
appellees.8" They argued that the United States had negotiated an agreement
with Caribbean basin nations to protect and conserve sea turtles but did not
propose negotiations with the appellees until after having concluded an
agreement with other members.86 The appellees further stated that section 609
was interpreted correctly by applying the restrictions of the chapeau before
addressing whether the United States trade restriction qualified as an
exception."
B. The Appellate Body Ruling
The first order of the Appellate Body decision was to determine whether
the Section 609 trade restriction provisionally qualified under the Article XX
exceptions." The Appellate Body found that the Panel ruled incorrectly in
making the chapeau and not paragraph (g) the critical test.89 It held that the
Panel misinterpreted Reformulated Gasoline by evaluating the United States
measure initially under the chapeau conditions.9 ° The Appellate Body recalled
that Reformulated Gasoline asked first whether the trade measure qualified
provisionally under paragraphs (b) or (g), and then applied the chapeau test.9"
The Appellate Body reversed the Panel's legal interpretation of initially
applying the measure to the chapeau test.92
The Appellate Body's second step was to examine if the section 609 trade
restriction qualified as an exception under paragraph (g). Did the measure
qualify as a conservation measure of an exhaustible natural resource? The
appellees argued that "exhaustible" referred to finite resources such as a mineral
as opposed to biological resources.93 The Appellate Body held that biological
science had taught them that species, in principle, are capable of reproduction
and in that sense renewable, and are in certain circumstances susceptible of94
depletion, exhaustion, and extinction, frequently because of human activity.

85.

Id.

86.

Appellate Body Report I, supra note, 9

87.

Id. 143.

88.

Id.1 115.

89.

Gaines, , supra note 57, at 770.

90.

Id.

91.

Id. at 771.

92.

Appellate Body Report I, supra note 9,

93.

Id.

94.

Id.

128.

41.

122.
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The Appellate Body also referred to the following preamble of the WTO
agreement to emphasize the generic use of the terms "resources" and
"sustainable development."
The Parties to this Agreement, Recognizing that their relations in the field
of trade and economic endeavor should be conducted with a view to raising
standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing
volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production and
trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking
both to protect and preserve the environment."95
The Appellate Body ruled that sea turtles constituted an exhaustible natural
resource under paragraph (g). 96
Having determined that the Section 609 guidelines qualified provisionally
under paragraph (g) of Article XX, the Appellate Body next addressed the
requirements under the Article XX chapeau. The Appellate Body examined the
overall context for discrimination under the chapeau and identified four discrete
areas of the United States policy under Section 609 that constituted arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination but reached no conclusion regarding Section 609
as a disguised trade restriction. 97 The Appellate Body ruled that the inflexibility
of the United States certification policy was unjustifiably and arbitrarily
discriminatory and that the United States lack of effort to negotiate a
multilateral treaty with appellees and the differential treatment towards
members was unjustifiably discriminatory.9 8
The Appellate Body ruled the section 609 certification process to be
unjustifiably and arbitrarily discriminatory because it imposed a mandatory,
rigid requirement for TEDs on countries applying for certification, without
considering the prevailing conditions in the exporting country. 99 The Section
609 1996 guidelines were ruled discriminatory because they were too inflexible
in allowing inquiry into the appropriateness of the program for the conditions
prevailing in the exporting countries."° The Appellate Body labeled Section
609 as an economic embargo that forced other members to adopt the same
comprehensive regulatory program that was in force in the United States
without taking into consideration "different conditions" which "may" occur in
other members' territories. ' 0' It further ruled that the United States prohibition
95.

Id. [ 129.

96.

Id. 1 134.

97.

Gaines,, supra note 57, at 773.

98.

Appellate Body Report 1,supra note 9, W 161 - 185.

99.

Id. 177.

100.

Id.

101.

Id.

165.
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on the importation of wild shrimp and shrimp products from vessels that
employed TED's harvested in waters of countries that were not certified under
Section 609 was discriminatory.° 2 It preferred a ship-by-ship certification test
as opposed to the member-to-member certification requirement under Section
609.103 Furthermore, it found that the certification process was unjustifiable
under GATT because it was conducted in an informal and casual manner that
lacked due process and could negate members' rights."
It held that the
guidelines were not sufficiently "transparent" because members who were
denied certification failed to receive formal notification of such denial and there
was no formal appeal procedure for the denial of an application. 0 5
Secondly, the Appellate Body found that the United States entered into
serious multilateral negotiations regarding the implementation of TEDs with
some members but not with others.' °6 The United States negotiated an
international agreement for the protection and conservation of sea turtles
mandating the use of TEDs with Caribbean rim nations before the May 1996
guidelines became effective but negotiated with appellees after that date. 107 The
United States failure to initiate negotiations with all members exporting wild
shrimp to the United States weighed heavily in the Appellate Body's decision
in finding discrimination against the United States. It pointed out that the United
States did not follow its own law under section 609(a) (1) that directed the
Secretary of State to "initiate negotiations as soon as possible for the
development of bilateral or multilateral agreements with other nations for the
protection and conservation of ...
sea turtles."'0 8 The Appellate Body exhibited
a preference for treaties in dealing with environmental challenges outside the
member's borders by stating that environmental laws addressing global
environmental problems should be based on international consensus.'0 9 It
pointed out that the need for such agreements is recognized through the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development and Agenda, The Convention on
Biological Diversity, The Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species
of Wild Animals, and a CTE endorsement that international cooperation and
consensus is the most effective method of tackling transboundry environmental
problems. 0
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Lastly, the Appellate Body found differential treatment between different
members by the United States."' Under the Inter-American Convention, the
fourteen nations in the wider Caribbean and western Atlantic region had to
commit to the use of TEDs by 1994 and had a three year phase-in period to
implement the changes to their fleets." 2 With respect to the appellees and other
members, the United States Court of International Trade directed the
Department of State to apply the import ban worldwide no later than May 1996
thus leaving appellees only four months to comply with the United States
measure. 3 The shorter time period for compliance produced a heavier burden
on parties not part of the Inter-American Convention. The Appelate Body held
that the difference in treatment between shrimp exporting countries constituted
unjustifiable discrimination."'
C. United States Complies with Appellate Body Ruling
On July 8, 1999, in response to the Appellate Body's decision, the United
States substantially altered its shrimp importation certification guidelines. In
response to the inflexibility of the certification guidelines, it revised Section 609
by making the use of TED's optional. If sea turtles are present during trawling,
the new Section 609 guidelines state:
If the government of a harvesting nation demonstrates that it has
implemented and is enforcing a comparably effective regulatory
program to protect sea turtles in the course of shrimp trawl fishing
without the use of TEDs, that nation will also be eligible for
certification. Average incidental take rates will be deemed
comparable if the harvesting nation requires the use of TEDs or
otherwise demonstrates that it has implemented a comparably
effective program to protect sea turtles in the course of shrimp trawl
fishing without the use of TED's." 5
The United States also revised the section 609 guidelines to comply with
the Appellate Body's demand that the United States negotiate even-handedly
with all members and to provide a transparent certification system. The United
States agreed to notify members in writing who did not appear to qualify for
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certification by March 15th of every year." 6 The written notification will
explain the reasons for denial and suggested steps that will lead to
certification." 7 Between March 15 and May 1, the United States government
will allow the non-compliant member to offer evidence that it has met the
suggested steps." 8 On May 1, the United States Department of State will make
a formal decision on certification." 9 The United States also agreed to use a
revised "DSP- 121" form that certifies imported shrimp or shrimp products when
harvested in a country that is not
harvested by vessels using TEDs, even when
20
certified under the Section 609 guidelines. 1
D. Shrimp Turtle II
Despite United States compromise efforts, Malaysia filed another
complaint with the WTO arguing the remedial measures still didn't qualify
under Article XX of GATT.' 2' Malaysia argued that the United States did not
conclude a multilateral agreement with appellees, and that the United States
program is discriminatory because it conditions the import of shrimp on the
United States standards. 22 In June 2001, the Panel approved the United States
measures and the Appellate Body upheld the Panel's ruling.'2 3 They held that
the United States did not have to conclude a multilateral agreement, but rather
14
exhibit a "good faith" effort in a multilateral approach to an agreement.
Moreover, they held that the new, more flexible, Section 609 guidelines give
sufficient latitude to the exporting member in adopting their own turtle
protection program, thus is sufficiently flexible and not discriminatory. 25 The
Panel and Appellate Body agreed that the new guidelines would allow the
126
United States to consider particular conditions prevailing in foreign waters.
Was the WTO decision in Shrimp Turtle II evidence that free trade and
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environmental protection could coexist, or did it expose the WTO' s inability to
simultaneously accommodate free trade and protection of the environment?
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Conflict of interest
Multinational corporations, which rely on governmental free trade
perspectives, will hail the WTO ruling in Shrimp Turtle II as evidence that the
WTO can be a neutral arbiter of disputes between free trade and national
environmental laws.' 27 The WTO in Shrimp Turtle II had put itself on record
for the first time in not disqualifying a unilateral trade measure under Article
XX. 128 The United States environmental law was maintained, but was the
integrity of the law compromised through its transformation to WTO
conformity? Organizations with a global environmental prospective will
criticize the Shrimp Turtle II ruling as a blow to international environmental
protection and another relinquishment of United States environmental law
9
sovereignty to the WTO.1
The WTO has an inherent conflict of interest in neutrally arbitrating
disputes between trade and national environmental protection laws. Although
the WTO deserves credit for attempting to balance environmental and trade
concerns in Shrimp Turtle II, it is was a compromise weighted towards a free
trade perspective. The WTO is a trade promotion body not an environmental
regulatory body. 3 ' Its mandate is to reduce tariffs and destroy barriers to
trade."'3 The organization's mandate demands that it weigh decisions in favor
of free trade when balancing national environmental trade laws against
members' international trade obligations. The biggest challenge facing the
WTO and the global economy, as stated by WTO Director General Renato
Ruggiero, is divergent national regulatory structures, like environmental laws. 32
'
He claims that as tariffs are stripped away, WTO policy will focus on regulatory
differences, including environmental laws because they limit market access and
investment flows. '33 The WTO accommodates environmental laws to the extent
127.
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that they do not interfere with free trade. In Shrimp Turtle I, the Appellate
Body Report cites the creation of the CTE as an example of its commitment in
identifying and promoting positive interaction between trade and environmental
regulations.134 Yet, the CTE has made no substantive environmental protection
3
reformations to GATT. 1
It is not reasonable to expect an organization committed to free trade to
provide overriding deference to national environmental laws that are frequently
deemed as roadblocks to free trade. The WTO is directed to be a good steward
of the world's ecosystem, but only to the extent of promoting sustainable
development that is compatible with a non-discriminatory trading system. In
Shrimp Turtle II, the WTO approved a unilateral trade measure, but with very
circumscribed conditions.'36 Based on the Director General's statements, and
the rulings in Shrimp Turtle I and II, one must conclude that the WTO views
national environmental laws as disruptions in free trade and prefers that such
disputes be resolved outside the WTO framework. An analysis of the WTO
Shrimp Turtle rulings ruling reveals the subtle methodology the WTO used in
promoting uninhibited access to markets at the expense of global environmental
conservation.
The Appellate Body report in Shrimp Turtle I found the application of
Section 609 to be unjustifiably and arbitrarily discriminatory largely because:
the certification guidelines of Section 609 were too inflexible; the United States
failed to negotiate a multilateral agreement with the appellees; and the appellees
received differential treatment from the United States. 37 The Appellate Body
in Shrimp Turtle HI mitigated the decision in Shrimp Turtle I by ruling that the
United States could implement a unilateral environmental measure, but only
under severely constrained conditions. 3 '
B. Inflexibility
The Appellate Body in Shrimp Turtle I used questionable reasoning in
ruling that the inflexibility of the Section 609 doomed its compliance under the
Article XX chapeau. It ruled that the measure was "inflexible" and "coercive,"
and that it did not consider different "conditions" in a member's territory that
"may" occur.'39 The questionable reasoning surrounds the alleged discriminatory application of Section 609 as "inflexible" and "coercive" because it did not
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consider different "conditions" in members' territory that "may" occur.140 The
United States argument contending that the application of the Section 609 1996
guidelines was reasonable and not discriminatory appears justified because
TEDs were found by the NAS report to be the most effective form of sea turtle
conservation. Furthermore, the regulations were applied uniformly to United
States trawlers and foreign flagged trawlers. There is no mention of the terms
"coercive" or "inflexible" in defining unjustifiable discrimination in the chapeau
that the Appellate Body used to invalidate the United States law. The Appellate
Body found Section 609 coercive and inflexible because the United States only
recognized compliance under Section 609 when shrimp importing members'
used TEDs on their trawling vessels. The Section 609 guidelines mandated a
specific harvesting procedure without allowing flexibility for members to
employ comparable methods given their different conditions. Such reasoning
would be valid if different conditions prevailed in the South Asian seas.
The Appellate Body report implies that different conditions existed in
United States and South Asian waters that rendered the strict Section 609
guidelines discriminatory. 4' Yet, the Appellate Body report failed to identify
the different conditions that existed in Asian waters that made Section 609
unjustifiably discriminatory.'42 The demonstrated suitability of TEDs in the
Gulf of Mexico, the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean Sea should establish
convincing evidence that conditions in South Asia are not meaningfully
different for shrimp trawling with TEDs. 43
' The chapeau requires that measures
not be discriminatory where the same conditions prevail. Since conditions in
United States and South Asian waters are not meaningfully different, it appears
the use of TEDs is not discriminatory. The Appellate Body found Section 609
discriminatory because it did not take into considerations different conditions
that "may" occur in another member's territory. This interpretation runs counter
to the explicit language in the chapeau that disallows discriminatory measures
between members where the "same conditions" prevail. 44 In the end, the
Shrimp Turtle I chapeau analysis turned the chapeau provision on it head.'45
The Appellate Body analysis has in effect precluded not only measures that
discriminate where the same conditions prevail, but measures that do not
consider different conditions that "may" prevail. This chapeau analysis
effectively precludes members from adopting environmental measures that
require a specific technology for the conservation of the environment, even if
140.
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that technology is reasonably obtainable and vastly superior to other methods.
The NAS report described TEDs as the best method of reducing turtle mortality
short of eliminating trawling. The Department of State stated that TED's are
at modest expense
readily available on the open market or can be constructed
46
from materials that are readily available on the market.1
It should be expected on occasion that unilateral environmental protection
measures imposed by economically and legally advanced members will be
challenged by lesser-developed members as discriminatory. The WTO ruling
in Shrimp Turtle I and Shrimp Turtle II diluted the technologically advanced
measure of the United States to the level of the lesser-developed member, like
Malaysia, in order to maintain Malaysia's environmental sovereignty.
Preserving the environmental sovereignty of lesser-developed members runs
counter to the global environmental perspective. The WTO promotion of free
access to markets is predicated on preserving the lesser-developed members
Yet, in order to promote environmental
environmental sovereignty.
sustainability, it is essential to preserve the advanced members environmental
sovereignty by approving reasonable unilateral measures that raise
environmental protection standards throughout the world. Members, such as the
United States and western European nations that have raced past other members
in environmental awareness and protection, are forced to degrade their laws to
accommodate access to their markets from other members who do not place the
same priority on environmental protection. Since the effectiveness of TEDs is
well established, a more appropriate WTO response would have been to allow
the use of TEDs as a criterion for import into the United States while granting
South Asian nations more time for compliance. Such a ruling would have truly
balanced free access to markets with global environmental protection.
C. Failureto Negotiate
In Shrimp Turtle I, the WTO shifted the burden of international
environmental disputes away from itself and placed in the lap of the disputing
parties. The Appellate Body ruled that the United States failure to negotiate in
"serious, across-the-board negotiations," especially with the South Asian shrimp
trawling members, was a reason in finding of unjustifiable discrimination.'47 It
stated that the migratory nature of the sea turtle demanded a cooperative and
concerted measure of all the members.' 48 To emphasize the need for
international cooperation, the Appellate Body referred to the United States'
successful regional agreement to protect sea turtles through he Inter-American
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Convention. 49 The Shrimp Turtle I ruling failed to articulate any historical or
legal basis that failure to make efforts to negotiate a treaty falls within the
chapeau's meaning of unjustifiable discrimination. 150 The WTO's preference
for multilateral agreement resolution of international environmental trade
disputes is explicitly stated in the Appellate Body ruling by reference to several
international treaties promoting multilateral agreements for environmental trade
disputes.' 5 ' The message in Shrimp Turtle I is that the WTO will not allow a
member to use a unilateral measure to preserve an international resource. The
message in Shrimp Turtle H is that the WTO will allow a unilateral measure if
it is broad enough to make it practically ineffective. The CTE principles state
that the WTO agreement provides a forum for members to pursue national
environmental policies, provided that the policies are not discriminatory. The
Appellate Body in Shrimp Turtle I ruled that the unilateral national
environmental policies are discriminatory by nature when they lack international
consensus. Yet, if there were international consensus on a national
environmental policy, it would never be brought before the WTO DSB. The
Appellate Body used a circular argument, in effect, to find all unilateral
environmental trade measures discriminatory. This requirement was mitigated
by the Shrimp Turtle IIdecision that designated a "good faith" effort towards
multilateral agreement as non-discriminatory.
International consensus is not easy to accomplish. It must be noted that the
United States approached three of the complaining members in 1996 regarding
a multilateral agreement on sea turtle protection with no results.'52 A vivid
example of the difficulty of reaching global consensus or involvement on
crucial environmental issues is the Kyoto Protocol, calling for the systematic
reduction of worldwide carbon dioxide emissions. The Kyoto Protocol was
opened for signatures March 1997 and requires the signature of at least 55
countries.'53 Only 22 countries were reported to have ratified the Protocol as of
February 2000.'15 The Bush administration's opposition to the Protocol and its
plans not to participate has dimmed momentum and optimism that a global
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solution can be forged on worldwide climate change caused by carbon dioxide
emissions. 5'
The WTO decision also disregards the effectiveness in unilateral measures
in encouraging other nations to participate in conservation measures. The threat
of trade sanctions can be effective in luring unwilling members to the negotiating table that would otherwise ignore multilateral efforts at environmental
conservation. 51 6 Despite the efforts of the WTO to forge a compromise between
free trade and environmental protection, it is clear that from a global environmental perspective, it is not the best forum to resolve environmental disputes.'57
D. Differential Treatment
In Shrimp Turtle I, the United States measure was found unjustifiably
discriminatory because it resulted in differential treatment among members
during the certification process.' 58 It pointed to the three-year phase-in period
of TED technology for the countries under the Inter-American Convention as
contrasted to the four month period allowed appellees to implement TED
technology after passage of the 1996 Section 609 guidelines. 5 9 Perhaps the
United States could have been initially more aggressive in pursuing a worldwide
agreement with all nations that harvested wild shrimp where sea turtles were
present. The Appellate Body made a poignant observation in stating that
Section 609 (a) requires the Secretary of State to initiate negotiations with all
foreign governments engaged in fishing operations that might adversely affect
sea turtles. The WTO makes a valid claim that the United States did not strictly
adhere to its own law in not reaching out simultaneously to the appellees and the
countries that forged the Inter-American Convention. Yet, the Appellate Body
failed to recognize that the United States agreement with the Western
hemisphere countries was not discriminatory under GATT because those
negotiations had no effect on the import restrictions in the 1996 Section 609
guidelines. 160 The regional cooperation agreement that was finalized as the
Inter-American Convention did not precipitate the later 1996 guidelines.' 6'
Moreover, nothing in the record confirms the Appellate Body's assumption that
the appellees would have negotiated seriously with the United States on sea
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turtle protection. 162 The WTO Shrimp Turtle II ruling held that the new United
States guidelines provided for more international cooperation between members
and a more transparent certification process.
E. Impact on Section of 609
The effectiveness of Section 609 was compromised when the United States
revised the certification guidelines to comply with the Appellate Body decision.
Under the revised 1999 guidelines, a member trawling in waters where sea
turtles were present need only provide documentary evidence that its program
is "comparable" to that of the United States in the incidental taking of sea
turtles. 163 Evaluating comparability of members trawling activities has added
a layer of complexity to the verification process. The system of evaluating
comparability is predictably more vulnerable to fraud than the 1996 guidelines
requiring the mandatory use of TEDs. The United States highlighted the results
of the revised guidelines in its defense against Malaysia in the Shrimp Turtle II
Panel report. The United States cited that Pakistan and Malaysia were now
compliant under the revised Section 609 guidelines.' 6 Pakistan was certified
based on a program combining trawling prohibitions and the use of TEDs, and
certification for Malaysia would be granted despite the absence of the use of
TEDs in Malaysian waters. 6 '
The United States was also forced to revise it's guidelines to allow
importation of shrimp and shrimp products from TED equipped vessels harvesting in a member's uncertified waters. This ship-to-ship certification system is
arguably a more complex certification system. The 1996 member-to-member
mandatory TED use guidelines were far less burdensome on the United States
government. As the complexity of a verification system increases, so does its
vulnerability to fraud. The revised 1999 guidelines provide for a more difficult
and complex verification procedure that inevitably provides less sea turtle
protection than intended by the original 1996 guidelines.
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V. CONCLUSION

The Shrimp Turtle dispute presents a vivid example of how two opposing
perspectives can interpret a decision differently. From a trade perspective, the
WTO did an admirablejob in accommodating an environmental based unilateral
trade measure within the rules of the WTO. From an environmental perspective, the WTO compromised United States sovereignty and global environmental protection by diluting a United States law aimed at protecting a global
resource. The WTO essentially gutted a United States law mandating a technology far superior to other turtle protection methods. The WTO free trade
rulings, as evidenced in the Shrimp Turtle disputes, are predicated on preserving
the environmental sovereignty of members with less environmental awareness,
in which case, the United States will always come out a loser. The WTO could
have reasonably compromised by maintaining the TED technology requirement
of the United States law and demanding reformation of the other aspects of the
Section 609 guidelines it found discriminatory. Instead, it gave full deferential
treatment to the unbridled flow of trade and forced the United States to change
an effective law that preserved an endangered international environmental
resource. This trend does not bode well for future United States and global
environmental protection efforts. It is evident through the Shrimp Turtle
decisions that the United States will have to work with other members outside
the WTO framework to preserve the global environment. Without the threat of
unilateral trade measures, efforts at reaching international accords will be
rendered impotent. Due to its WTO obligations, the United States government
will have to tailor future unilateral environmental protection measures so
broadly as to render them ineffective. The United States WTO obligations have
forced an ever-growing and permanent relinquishment of United States environmental law sovereignty in order to accommodate its WTO obligations dictating
free access to the United States market.

